Innovation needs everyone.

ModelCivic Investment Cooperation
01Core idea

CIVINCO makes household capital investable in early-stage innovation. Under conditions of transparency, limited risk and mediated complexity.

CIVINCO is

a publicly accountable framework for citizen investorship. Private households decide for themselves which early ventures they invest in, each with a micro-investment. A public operator runs the procedure; an independent Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) safeguards the quality of information.1

CIVINCO is not

  • a private intermediary earning commissions
  • a return product with promises
  • a fund, public or private: no one decides on citizens’ behalf
  • a programme that distributes public money
1

Procedure without selection

The state makes citizen investment publicly traceable and accountable. It does not pick winners.

2

Mediation before choice

Because people avoid the unfamiliar, the complexity of early ventures is translated into a comparable form before anyone decides.

3

Limited, distributed risk

Micro-investments are capped and spread across several ventures. Nobody bears a disproportionate individual risk.

02Architecture

Six roles, clearly separated. Capital comes exclusively from citizens.

Architecture of CIVINCO At the top, the state’s legal framework. In the middle, the curated portfolio, run by the public operator. On the left, citizens: each person chooses individual ventures in the portfolio and invests a small, capped micro-investment in each of several ventures. There is no fund deciding for them. On the right, the admitted start-ups: per venture, the micro-investments are aggregated into a swarm investment, which is why the lines are thicker there. The EAC reviews the start-ups and provides standardised profiles to citizens. At the bottom, the technical service provider handling platform and payments. Financial supervision oversees the whole.
CapitalInformationProcedure and supervision

Micro-investment

The small, capped amount a person invests in a venture of their own choosing.

Swarm investment

The sum of many micro-investments in the same venture. It replaces no individual decision; it consists of them.

Aggregation

The rule-based summing of micro-investments per venture. Without discretion and without reallocation between ventures.

Citizen investorship

The guiding principle: citizens are independent investors. They decide for themselves; no fund decides for them.

Division of tasksUsing the example of a state-level model. The right-hand column matters as much as the middle one.
ActorTaskExplicitly not
State (ministry)Owner of the framework: creates the legal basis, mandates the operator, oversees the purpose.Not an investment decision-maker, not a capital provider
Public operatorPublic body commissioned by the state: runs the procedure, manages intake, provides the curated portfolio, acts as interface to founders.No capital provider in the portfolio, no investment advice, no selection on citizens’ behalf
EAC (advisory committee)Independent, purely professional body: admission review, translation into standardised profiles and curation according to published rules.No funding decisions, no financial interests
CitizensThe actual decision-makers: choose each venture themselves and invest their own capital as micro-investments, bound by caps.No compulsion, no unlimited exposure
Technical service providerPlatform and payment processing, commissioned through regular procedures.No decision-making power, no selection
Financial supervision (BaFin)Regulatory oversight, depending on the legal design.No operational involvement

None of the public bodies invests in the portfolio. That distinguishes CIVINCO from distribution models financed through commissions.

03Process

From venture to financing in seven steps. Every step is documented and publicly traceable.

  1. 01

    Intake

    Start-ups apply. The operator can bring in ventures that do not yet receive funding in existing programmes, such as very early ventures before their first proof.

  2. 02

    Admission

    The EAC reviews structure, documents, stage of development and goals against fixed criteria. Admission is not a recommendation.

  3. 03

    Profile

    Every admitted venture receives a standardised profile, the venture brief: technology, market, finances and risks in comparable form.

  4. 04

    Portfolio

    The portfolio is put together so that abstract, technology-intensive ventures also have a firm place.

  5. 05

    Decision

    Citizens choose for themselves, in the curated portfolio, which ventures they invest in, each as a micro-investment below caps set by the state. Every micro-investment is confirmed individually and actively; there is no default. No one decides for them.

  6. 06

    Aggregation

    Per venture, the micro-investments are aggregated into a swarm investment. The operator makes it traceable how many individual decisions become one financing.

  7. 07

    Feedback

    Regular reports on the development of the ventures and the portfolio. Experience turns into judgement.

04Intake and efficiency

Those who are too early elsewhere get a second chance here. Without the operator having to decide more.

The pipelineHow rejected early ventures enter CIVINCO, schematic
How rejected early ventures enter the CIVINCO pipeline Applications to existing funding programmes go through their review. Some are funded. Ventures rejected because they are too early may currently be left without follow-on support. With CIVINCO, with the founders’ consent, they can be handed over to the CIVINCO pipeline via a standardised form: admission, profile, portfolio, citizens’ decision.
45%of applications for the EXIST start-up grant have not been approved since 2007.7

Existing programmes sometimes reject ventures not for lack of quality but because they are too early for the programme in question: proof that the technology works is still missing. With the founders’ consent, the operator can transfer exactly these ventures into the CIVINCO portfolio via a standardised form. Existing application documents are reused.1 How large this intake would be depends on the programme: for the EXIST start-up grant, the approval rate since 2007 has been around 55 per cent, so more than four in ten applications are not approved.7 What share of these is rejected as too early is not reported.

Key point

This places the democratic core of the model exactly where a venture drops out of the system today: where a programme’s expert review says “not yet”, citizens can decide whether to give the venture a chance anyway.

What the operator does

  • Run and supervise the procedure
  • Manage intake and accept handovers
  • Document the aggregation per venture
  • Report regularly

What the operator is spared

  • Investment decisions per venture
  • A separate review per investment: the EAC reviews once against fixed criteria
  • Providing public capital
  • Portfolio management and investment advice
  • Payment processing, handled by a commissioned service provider

The model is designed so that the operator’s workload hardly grows with the number of ventures: decisions are spread across many citizens, review and profile follow a single standard. The cost model of phase 0 is to establish the actual workload.

05Why founders take part

A rejection says something about fit. That it says nothing about quality is something the procedure has to show.

The objection is obvious: a portfolio that also takes in ventures rejected by public programmes collects what nobody else wanted. CIVINCO would be a dumping ground, and the strongest teams would stay away.

The objection has empirical substance. For German platforms, Blaseg, Cumming and Koetter show that founders whose house bank is in distress turn to crowdfunding more often and fail more often.10 For the United Kingdom, Walthoff-Borm, Schwienbacher and Vanacker find that companies using equity crowdfunding have exhausted their borrowing capacity further and are less profitable than comparable companies that do not.11

Two differences are therefore structural, not rhetorical. The standard route into the portfolio is the application, not the rejection; the transfer from a programme is an additional channel. And admission is not decided by a platform financed through fees, but by an expert review against published criteria. Adverse selection is not ruled out by this. But it is examined at a point where private platforms provide for no independent expert review of the venture.

Two ways in, one reviewHow a venture enters the portfolio, schematic
Two routes into the portfolio, one review On the left two entrances: the application as the standard route and the transfer from a programme that rejected a venture as too early. Both lead through the same EAC review against published criteria into the curated portfolio. Below is what a venture receives there: capital from many micro-investments, an early demand signal and continued access to other financing routes. Schematic representation.

Admission reviews whether the conditions of the procedure are met, not whether a venture deserves funding. What share of the programme rejections is due to being too early is not reported.7

There is also what many participants provide beyond capital. In the research literature, crowdfunding works as an information mechanism: it produces an early signal about demand and interest.12 The limit belongs to the picture: a successful campaign alone does not attract professional investors; it works only together with hard quality signals such as intellectual property and partnerships.13

For a team the terms are sober: no intermediation fee, because the operator has no commercial interest; existing application documents are reused; the amounts are capped and the stake given up stays small; and the share register gains one entry, not a thousand. See How the participation is held.

Whether that is enough is an empirical question. For a complete cohort of one British platform, Signori and Vismara report that 18 per cent of the companies failed and about a third raised a further equity round.14 A direct comparison of failure rates with companies financed by angels or funds is not available at present. That is why the composition of the portfolio is one of the metrics of a pilot. See Evaluation and implementation.

06Three pillars

Legitimacy, mediation, shared responsibility. Each pillar answers a named problem.

A

Procedural legitimacy

Answer to the trust deficit

The aggregation of many micro-investments into a swarm investment is fully traceable. Allocation follows fixed rules, without discretion and without informal intermediaries. Participants receive regular reports on the development of the ventures and the portfolio.

This creates procedural trust: the certainty that what was promised happens with one’s own contribution. It does not create trust in the quality of individual ventures, and CIVINCO does not claim that it does. Legitimacy is necessary for broad participation, but not sufficient for good decisions.12

Why a public operator?

  1. Credible, especially in loss. An early-stage portfolio contains failures. That is exactly when the operator must remain neutral. Whoever earns from fees or commissions has different incentives.
  2. Reach as a mandate. The value of the model grows with broad and diverse participation. A public operator pursues this as a mandate, not as a marketing cost.
  3. Fitting the problem. Households’ reluctance is rooted in a lack of trust in institutions. An operator with public, rule-bound legitimacy addresses exactly this deficit.

Platform and payments can be outsourced to supervised service providers. The guarantee of the procedure is a public good.

B

Information mediation

Answer to complexity

The EAC, staffed with experts in venture capital valuation, financial and risk analysis, technology assessment and industry dynamics, translates the complexity of early ventures into decision-relevant form. It holds no stakes in the companies it reviews and is separated from political influence and private financial interests.

Admission is not a recommendation

The EAC checks whether a venture meets the procedural requirements, not whether it deserves funding. This protects citizens’ freedom of decision and limits the state’s reputational risk.

Legible, not enticing

The standardised profiles are a deliberate countermeasure against the pull of the familiar. They are meant to make an abstract deep-tech venture understandable, not attractive. Their organising principle is comparability, not persuasiveness.

Regular feedback on the portfolio closes the loop: whoever works repeatedly with reviewed information and observable results sharpens their judgement without having to become an analyst.

C

Shared responsibility

Answer to individual risk

State-set maximum amounts per venture and per calendar year, and a cap on each household’s total annual participation, prevent excessive commitment, even if someone wanted it. They enforce micro-investment. The legislator sets the specific amounts.

Each person spreads their micro-investments across several ventures, and each venture gathers the capital of many people. This creates diversification on both sides.

07EAC

The EAC is the key lever of the model. It reviews and translates, but it does not decide.

Composition of the EACSix fields of expertise, one professional task
Composition of the EAC: six fields of expertise around one shared, purely professional task EACreviews · translates Venture capital valuationFinancial andrisk analysisTechnology assessmentIndustry andinnovation dynamicsConsumer protection andfinancial literacyLaw andfinancial regulation
  • 4 of 6fields of expertise form the core of the committee
  • 2 of 6fields of expertise are proposed in addition

The Expert Advisory Committee translates the complexity of early ventures into a form on which lay people can decide on a comparable basis. Its role is professional, not allocative: it does not determine who receives money, but under which information conditions citizens decide.1

Because the strength of this mediation decides whether CIVINCO improves or worsens capital allocation, the EAC is the component on which the model succeeds or fails.

Venture capital valuation

Assesses business model, funding needs and milestones like an early-stage investor.

Financial and risk analysis

Reviews financial information, capital structure and risks and makes them comparable.

Technology assessment

Assesses readiness, feasibility and novelty of the technology, especially in deep tech.

Industry and innovation dynamics

Places market, competition and development paths of the respective industry in context.

Consumer protection and financial literacy

Ensures that profiles and risk warnings are understandable for lay people and not promotional.

additional proposal

Law and financial regulation

Checks the admission requirements and compliance with the procedural rules.

additional proposal
Task 1

Admission

Reviews structure, financial information, stage of development and goals against published criteria. Admission is not a recommendation.

Task 2

Profile

Prepares a standardised profile for every venture. The yardstick is comparability, not persuasiveness.

Task 3

Curation

Assembles the portfolio according to published rules so that abstract, technology-intensive ventures also have a firm place.

Task 4

Feedback

Reports on the development of the ventures and the portfolio so that participants can sharpen their judgement.

Independence

  1. No stakes: Members hold no financial interests in reviewed ventures.1
  2. No instructions: The EAC is separated from political influence and private financial interests.1
  3. Disclose conflicts: Anyone with a connection to a venture takes no part in its review.
  4. Public criteria: Admission criteria and the profile format are published.
  5. Fixed terms: Members are appointed for a limited term so that the EAC does not ossify.

The first two points and the four fields of expertise with a source reference come from the working paper. The other rules and the two additional fields are design proposals.

08Risk

CIVINCO does not eliminate risk. It limits and distributes it.

1 Individual levelSmall amounts, fixed caps
2 Portfolio levelSpread across many ventures
3 System levelCarried by many people

At the individual level, the small size of contributions keeps the burden low. At the portfolio level, it is spread across different ventures. At the system level, early-stage risk is carried jointly by a broad base of participants.

The total loss of a single micro-investment remains possible. The state guarantees no return and assumes no losses; it safeguards the integrity of the procedure. The political worst case, someone losing their savings, is to be ruled out by design through caps, small amounts and diversification.

Diversification limits individual harm and evens out random misjudgements. It does not correct systematic bias against the new; that requires mediation and curation. That is why pillars B and C complement rather than replace each other.

On a workbench in the morning sun stands a half-finished prototype with open electronics, next to aluminium parts, a calliper and a sketchbook; seedlings grow in clay pots on the windowsill.
Early stage

Before there is proof. Whether the technology works is still open. That is why the risk is shared.

09Collective risk-sharing

Many people each risking little can carry what no single person carries alone. That is the core of collective risk-sharing.

Who carries a venture?Four ways of carrying the same financing, worked example
Who carries a venture: four routes compared Four ways of financing one venture with €100,000, shown as bars of equal length. For the business angel the bar is a single block: one person carries €100,000. For the venture capital fund there are about twenty blocks of €5,000 each, with the fund management making the selection. For the public programme the bar breaks into very many small parts, carried by all taxpayers, who take no part in the decision. For CIVINCO it consists of 2,000 parts of €50 each, shown as 200 indicative segments, and each person has chosen their part themselves.
Worked example for a financing of €100,000. For CIVINCO one segment stands for ten people; for public programmes the number of parts is indicative only. The caps are set by the legislator.

If the investment decision is taken in a decentralised way and the micro-investments are then aggregated, a form of risk-sharing arises that does not yet exist in the early stage. A business angel carries the risk of a venture alone. A fund concentrates it in a few, mostly institutional investors who delegate the selection to a management team. A public programme spreads it across all taxpayers, who take no part in the decision. In CIVINCO, each person carries a small, self-chosen share.

How many people can carry a venture is therefore no longer limited by financial strength but by participation. The working paper calls this collective risk-sharing.1

Voluntary

No one is involved without wanting to be. That distinguishes this sharing from financing out of public budgets.

Self-chosen

People carry only what they have selected themselves. That distinguishes it from holding a share in a fund.

Capped per head

The caps keep each individual contribution small, even when the sum per venture grows large.

Collective risk-sharing does not replace review. It works only together with intermediation and curation; otherwise it spreads systematic misjudgements more widely instead of balancing them out.

10Participation and return

Citizens do not hand over money, they take a stake. A return only arises when a venture reaches an exit event.

A micro-investment is a micro-stake. Whoever invests a small amount in a venture holds a correspondingly small share of it. This is neither a donation nor an interest-bearing product: there is no ongoing distribution and no promised repayment.

A return only arises at an exit event, such as an acquisition, a sale of shares or a listing. Until then the capital is tied up. The model does not provide for a secondary market on which stakes could be passed on; early-stage participations are designed to last many years.

In a young venture the same amount means a larger share than in a large company. That is not an advantage but a definition: the share is large because the company’s value is small and the uncertainty is high. The two belong together.

In the early stage, failure is the normal case and not the exception; a few ventures carry the losses of the rest.8 Diversification across several ventures is therefore built into the procedure and not merely a recommendation.

Ten ventures, schematicWhy diversification is part of the procedure
Possible outcomes of ten early-stage ventures Ten ventures side by side, each with an equally large investment below a baseline. Above the line is the return: for six ventures there is none, for two it stays below the amount invested, for one it is slightly above, and for a single one, highlighted in blue, it is far above. A dashed line marks the level of the investment. Schematic illustration without measured values.
Schematic distribution, not a forecast and not a statement about returns.

This section explains what a participation is; it does not advertise an investment. Whether and in what form shares are issued is decided by the legal design in phase 0.

11How the participation is held

Two thousand micro-participations, one entry. That is the hardest open question of the model, not the easiest.

No founding team wants two thousand shareholders. In a German limited company every transfer of a share requires notarial form,19 and the shareholder list in the commercial register makes the name, date of birth and place of residence of every single person public. Direct mass participation in a limited company is therefore ruled out in practice, before anyone even mentions consents in later rounds.

The obvious answer is a company that holds one stake and administers the micro-participations. It solves the problem in the share register and creates a second one: under the German supervisor’s interpretative guidance, what matters for classification as a collective investment undertaking is whether the investment criteria are precisely determined and the room for manoeuvre is restricted.17 A vehicle whose articles name exactly one venture meets that criterion rather than escaping it. A lack of discretion does not help here. And where investors participate through a trustee, the supervisor looks through the trustee to the investors.

One entry instead of two thousandWhat bundling achieves in the share register, schematic
Shareholder list with and without bundling On the left, a stack of list pages: each micro-investment is a separate row with name, date of birth and place of residence; two thousand rows at thirty rows per page make 67 pages. On the right, the same list on a single page with three rows: founding team, one entry for all participating citizens, later investors. Below it, 2,000 dots for the micro-investments behind that one entry. Schematic illustration.

The figure of two thousand follows the worked example in section 09. The illustration shows the effect, not the legal form.

Three routes remain, and each has a price.

Three ways to hold the participationWhat each route delivers and what it costs
RouteWhat it deliversPrice
Contractual participationProfit-participating subordinated loans create no shareholder status and are the established route of German crowdinvesting. The exemption for crowdfunding applies to them up to six million euros per issuer over twelve months.18No ownership, only a contractual claim
Public limited company registered shares are transferred without notarial form, the share register is not public, and shares are tradable under the European crowdfunding regulation.20A supervisory board, a general meeting and an audit even for a very early venture
Bundling per ventureOne entry in the shareholder register instead of two thousand.The supervisory clarification described above

The European crowdfunding regulation allows an interposed special purpose vehicle only for a single illiquid or indivisible asset, and the decision on the participation must be taken by the investors alone.15 The second part fits CIVINCO exactly. Whether a stake in a single start-up is the first part has not been decided; there is no published position on it.

There is also a German peculiarity: shares in limited liability companies are not an instrument admitted for crowdfunding purposes in Germany. In the overview of the European securities supervisor the entry for Germany reads “None”, while Spain, Estonia, Denmark and Finland have notified their equivalents.16 That notification is an administrative step, not a change in the law. It would be the smallest conceivable move to open the way for the model, and at the same time the point at which the debate about the notarial form would have to be held.

What holds regardless of the route: what is bundled is the administration, not the decision. Each person chooses their own venture, there is no reallocation between ventures, and a return is distributed at an exit event according to fixed rules. Which legal form carries this is the first question of phase 0 and not a footnote. See Evaluation and implementation.

12No game mechanics

Participation must not feel like a game. What creates attention causes harm here.

Interfaces that invite competition shift the decision from the matter at hand to comparison with others. Leaderboards, countdowns and other people’s visible amounts create pressure to add more. That would create the impression of gambling, and the model would fail politically before it is examined on the merits.

In legal terms CIVINCO is not gambling: what is acquired is a stake in a company, the outcome depends on that company’s development and not on chance, and no stake is placed against an operator. This distinction only holds as long as the interface does not undermine it.

What the procedure rules outInterface and rules, not just declarations of intent
ExcludedEffect avoidedInstead
Leaderboards, rankings, other people’s amounts visiblesocial comparison, outbiddingOnly your own position is visible
Countdowns, progress bars, scarcity signalstime pressure and herdingDeadlines are stated, without a race
Points, streaks, badges, referral bonusesrepetition for the sake of the rewardNo reward for frequency
Notifications urging you to add moreimpulse decisionsMessages only about procedural steps
Payment by credit or instalmentsinvesting beyond one’s own meansPayment only from existing funds
Secondary market and ongoing tradingprice watching, short-term tradingParticipation until the exit event

In addition there are the safeguards that the European crowdfunding regulation requires anyway: an entry knowledge test and a simulation of the ability to bear loss before the first investment, as well as a reflection period of four calendar days during which an investment offer can be withdrawn without giving reasons and without penalty.9

The caps per venture and per year apply irrespective of this. Over-indebtedness is not built into the procedure, because only what is available can be invested: no credit financing, no instalments, no obligation to pay in further funds.

13The condition

Broad participation does not improve capital allocation by itself. Whether it does depends on a condition that can be named.

Dispersed, non-professional investors prefer the familiar and the understandable. Radically new ventures fare worse in crowdfunding than incremental improvements.3 In the most direct comparison of crowds and experts, the two largely agree, and where they differ, the crowd tends to fund what experts reject. But it does not rate novelty more highly.4

It follows that the crowd is generous, but along a dimension that need not coincide with technological novelty. Without a countermeasure, CIVINCO would filter the new more strictly than the capital it is meant to complement. The decisive lever is therefore the strength of information mediation.1

The condition as a mechanismSchematic, based on the working paper
The condition: strength of information mediation A radically new venture meets information mediation. If it is weak, the discount on the unfamiliar prevails, novelty remains underfunded and capital allocation gets worse. If it is strong, perceived distance falls, novelty is funded and capital allocation improves.
P1

Discount on the unfamiliar

Without mediation, citizens fund abstract, technology-intensive ventures less often than an expert benchmark, at equal quality.

P2

Mediation as moderator

Standardised, comparable profiles reduce this discount: the stronger the mediation, the more.

P3

Correction through the portfolio

Diversification and curation mitigate the effects of individual biases at system level.

P4

Conditional superiority

CIVINCO improves allocation relative to the status quo only if P2 and P3 together are strong enough to outweigh P1. Otherwise it worsens it.

Four conditions of success

  1. Sufficient mediation: The profiles reduce the discount enough that deep tech is not systematically underfunded.
  2. Curation with integrity: New ventures have a real place in the portfolio and are not screened out in advance.
  3. Broad participation: Participants are numerous and diverse enough for individual biases to even out.
  4. Neutral operator: The procedure remains credible even in case of loss.

Naming the sources of failure openly is not a hedge but the core: it shows what must be measured and what must be protected.

14Evaluation and implementation

Every assumption is testable. A limited pilot is the beginning, not the goal.

Evaluation architectureWhat a pilot must measure, and how
QuestionMetricApproach
Do citizens underfund novelty?Novelty profile of funded versus admitted venturesComparison of citizens’ decisions with blind expert ratings of the same ventures
Does mediation reduce the discount?Discount on the unfamiliar as a function of the comparability of profilesRandom variation of the profile format between ventures or groups
Does the portfolio correct biases?Novelty profile of the portfolio versus individual decisionsComparison with a scenario of unmediated individual choice
Is CIVINCO better than the status quo?Survival, follow-on funding and novelty of the funded venturesStaged pilot with a comparison group from conventional early-stage channels
Is participation broad and lasting?Depth of participation, retention, representativenessLongitudinal observation of participants

The most important opportunity for measurement lies in the EAC: because admission and selection are separate, every citizen decision can be compared with a blind expert rating of the same ventures.1

Roadmap: the steps show the sequence, not the timetable.

Implementation roadmap: four phases, two evaluations An area rises from bottom left to top right and stands for the reach of the procedure. Six vertical lines mark phase 0 review, phase 1 pilot, an evaluation, phase 2 state level, a second evaluation and phase 3 federal and EU level, each with bullet points. Horizontal arrows show which workstreams run across several phases: EAC, inflow from programmes, evaluation, legal form and supervision, pilot and expansion. Schematic illustration without a timetable.

The four phases follow the working paper.1 Phase 3 links to the European Savings and Investments Union.5 Each expansion requires that the success conditions of the preceding phase have been proven.

The regulatory classification depends on the design, for instance under the German Capital Investment Act, the European Crowdfunding Regulation or the German Capital Investment Code.6 Clarifying it is the task of phase 0. What matters is that the choice stays with the citizens; how the participation is then held is a separate question. See How the participation is held.

15Objections

The obvious questions. And the short answers.

Isn’t CIVINCO simply INVEST for everyone?

No. INVEST makes an investment cheaper for business angels who already have access to it. CIVINCO creates access in the first place, for households that structurally lack it, and without necessarily subsidising their investment. The state provides no capital in CIVINCO.

Is this a sovereign fund?

No. No public money flows into the portfolio, and no public body selects ventures. The state guarantees the procedure, not the outcome.

Is CIVINCO a fund?

No. In a fund, a management team decides where pooled capital goes. In CIVINCO, each citizen chooses for themselves, in the curated portfolio, which ventures their own micro-investments go to. Per venture, only what individuals have chosen is aggregated: that is what forms the swarm investment, not a decision by the operator.

How does CIVINCO differ from crowdinvesting?

Private platforms finance themselves through fees and intermediation. The key investment information sheet is drawn up by the project owner; an independent expert review of the ventures is not provided for. CIVINCO relies on a public operator without commercial interest, reviewed and comparable profiles, mandatory diversification and fixed caps.

Can citizens lose money?

Yes. A single micro-investment can fail completely. CIVINCO does not eliminate risk; it limits and distributes it so that damage relevant to a household is to be ruled out by caps, small amounts and diversification. The state guarantees no return and assumes no losses.

Who is liable if a venture fails?

Admission by the EAC is not a recommendation, and the operator runs the procedure without advising. Losses are an expected part of an early-stage portfolio and are reported openly, not concealed.

Does it actually work?

That is the right question, and it is open. CIVINCO is an untested model with clearly named conditions of success. That is why an evaluation architecture is part of the design and a limited pilot is where it starts.

16Sources

Sources for this page. Numbered as in the text.

The superscript numbers in the text refer to this list. The full derivation is set out in the working paper.

Behavioural foundations

Steiner, T. M. (2026). Collective Risk-Sharing in Innovation Finance: An Institutional Model of Citizen Investorship. Working paper, SSRN. Under review.DOI 10.2139/ssrn.6867205

  1. Steiner, T. M. (2026): Collective Risk-Sharing in Innovation Finance: An Institutional Model of Citizen Investorship. SSRN working paper. doi.org
  2. Luhmann, N. (1968): Vertrauen. Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität. Stuttgart: Enke.
  3. Chan, C. S. R. & Parhankangas, A. (2017): Crowdfunding Innovative Ideas: How Incremental and Radical Innovativeness Influence Funding Outcomes. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 41(2), 237–263.
  4. Mollick, E. & Nanda, R. (2016): Wisdom or Madness? Comparing Crowds with Expert Evaluation in Funding the Arts. Management Science, 62(6), 1533–1553.
  5. European Commission (2025): Savings and Investments Union, strategy of 19 March 2025. finance.ec.europa.eu
  6. Regulation (EU) 2020/1503 on European crowdfunding service providers; ESMA Q&A 2437. esma.europa.eu
  7. EXIST (2026): The EXIST start-up grant in figures, monitoring report no. 5 (6,051 applications and 3,331 approvals since 2007). exist.de
  8. Kerr, W. R., Nanda, R. & Rhodes-Kropf, M. (2014): Entrepreneurship as Experimentation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3), 25–48. doi.org
  9. Regulation (EU) 2020/1503 on European crowdfunding service providers for business, Articles 21 and 22. eur-lex.europa.eu
  10. Blaseg, D., Cumming, D. & Koetter, M. (2021): Equity Crowdfunding: High-Quality or Low-Quality Entrepreneurs? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 45(3), 505–530. doi.org
  11. Walthoff-Borm, X., Schwienbacher, A. & Vanacker, T. (2018): Equity crowdfunding: First resort or last resort? Journal of Business Venturing, 33(4), 513–533. doi.org
  12. Agrawal, A., Catalini, C. & Goldfarb, A. (2014): Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 14, 63–97. doi.org
  13. Roma, P., Messeni Petruzzelli, A. & Perrone, G. (2017): From the crowd to the market: The role of reward-based crowdfunding performance in attracting professional investors. Research Policy, 46(9), 1606–1628. doi.org
  14. Signori, A. & Vismara, S. (2018): Does success bring success? The post-offering lives of equity-crowdfunded firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, 575–591. doi.org
  15. Regulation (EU) 2020/1503 on European crowdfunding service providers, Article 3(6) and Article 2(1); ESMA, Questions and Answers on the use of special purpose vehicles, 25 February 2021. esma.europa.eu
  16. ESMA (2026): Crowdfunding tables, ESMA35-42-1305, as at 27 July 2026, Table 1 on Article 2(3) (entry for Germany: None). esma.europa.eu
  17. BaFin (2013): Interpretative letter on the scope of the German Capital Investment Code and the concept of a collective investment undertaking, reference Q 31-Wp 2137-2013/0006 of 14 June 2013, amended on 9 March 2015. bafin.de
  18. German Capital Investment Act, § 1(2) and § 2a (exemption for crowdfunding, six million euros per issuer in twelve months). gesetze-im-internet.de
  19. German Limited Liability Companies Act, § 15(3) (notarial form of transfer) and § 40 (shareholder list with name, date of birth and place of residence). gesetze-im-internet.de
  20. German Stock Corporation Act, § 67 (share register) and § 68 (transfer of registered shares). gesetze-im-internet.de